We analyze the determinants of performance in small unlisted family firms, and find, in l i n e w i t h p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s , a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a f a m i l y C E O . W e contribute to previous literature by also analyzing the effect of board size in these already small family boards, where the maximum number of board members is 6. We find that even here, board size is significantly negatively associated with firm performance. We also bring in a novel variable, the proportion of family members employed by the firm, and find a negative effect especially for ROI . There is a significant tendence for family CEOs to employ more family members, which -given the negative effect of these -should take off some of the positive performance effects of a family CEOs.
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Introduction
Family firms are common among unlisted as well as public corporations around the world. 1 Family ownership has been associated with several valuation and firm performance effects.
First, family ownership and high levels of corporate control are often linked. Thus an agency problem 2 may be created between the controlling family and minority owners, resulting in a valuation discount (see e.g. Claessens et al 2002, and Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003) . Second, family ownership seems to be value enhancing in listed firms, as compared to other forms of ownership (see e.g. Anderson and Reeb (2003) for the U.S., and Maury (2006) for Western Europe). 3 Third, the value or performance enhancing effects of family ownership seem to be present above all when the family actively manages the firm through a family member as the CEO or chairman of the board, see e.g. Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006) for both value and ROA effects, and Villalonga and Amit (2006) for valuation effects. 4 Using data for Finland, we study the family effects on firm performance in a sample of small unlisted family firms. For such firms, there is much less empirical research on both the performance effects of family, active family management, as well as outside 1 Se e.g. Schleifer and Vishny 1986 for Fortune 500 firms (149 families on board), La Porta et al 1999 in 27 richest economies (30% controlled by family or individual), Claessens et al 2000 for East Asia (over two thirds controlled by families or individuals), and Faccio and Lang (2002) for 13 Western European countries (44% of the firms are family controlled). 2 Villalonga and Amit (2006) refer to this as the Agency Problem II, as opposed to the Agency Problem I between owners and the management, as described by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) . This effect is also typically called an entrenchment effect. 3 Anderson and Reeb (2003) does not consider control enhancing mechanisms such as several share classes or pyramids, only family ownership and management, while Maury (2006) includes both ownership, control, and active management related variables. 4 Villalonga and Amit (2006) moreover separate between founder CEOs and descendants, and find the positive effects only for actively involved founders, while there are significant negative effects for descendants. Higher effects for founders vs descendants have also e.g. been found by Barontini and Caprio (2006) . Adams et al (2008) found that this effect is present even after contolling for endogeneity issues.
2 blockholders 5 and external board members in family boards, or on the impact board size in family firms in general. Yet family firms are a dominating ownership form among the unlisted firms on many markets. In line with previous literature, we find that a family CEO has a significant positive effect on firm profitability. Surprisingly, also the board size has a significant negative effect on profitability even when the board size in general is small (never exceeding 6 members) in our data set. We also produce novel evidence on a new variable, the proportion of family employees, which is significantly negatively related especially with the return on investment (ROI). Since we also find that a family CEO significantly more often employs family members, this result gives a negative twist to the overall positive effect of a family CEO.
We contribute to the previous literature firstly by jointly analyzing a rich set of variables for family SMEs : the joint effects of ownership concentration by the largest owner, variables for active management (a family CEO or chairman, family board members), and board size. Of these, board size is a novel variable used in this context (i.e. we produce evidence of the mitigating impact of board size in family firms, when used together with variables for active family management). Since the effect of the CEO may be endogeneous (e.g. conditioned on past performance) 6 , we perform controls for such effects. Secondly, we contribute by a new variable, the fraction of family employees among all employees.
5 In some of the above studies, also effects of other governance mechanisms (which may control for the entrenchment effect) such as non-family blockholders, and external board members, have been studied. The results concerning the potential performance improvements associated with these are more mixed. Anderson and Reeb (2003) found somewhat varying signs and significance levels for both outside blockholdings as well as outside directors in different model specifications. Also in Maury (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) , the results are ambiguous for multiple / nonfamily blockholders, while nonfamily outside directors are insignificant in the latter.
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The structure of this report is as follows. In section two, we survey key literature in the area, and present our main hypotheses. In section three, the data and variables are described. Section four presents our results, while conclusions are given in section five.
Family ownership and firm performance
2.1. Family ownership and control E.g. Shleifer and Vishy (1986) observe that large shareholders are common 7 , and that a particular group, founding families, continue to hold large stakes in even large U.S. firms.
As typically poorly diversified investors, their incentives may differ from those of other, better diversified owners, potentially leading to control problems (entrenchment effects)
between the controlling owners and other owners. Such entrenchment effects have been studied both in general, as well as with a focus on family firms, with varying results.
Studying managerial ownership, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) found an inverse Ushaped relationship between ownership stakes and valuation. A theoretical model producing such a concave relationship was produced by Stultz (1988) , with more empirical support provided by e.g. McConnell and Servaes (1990) , while Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) provide evidence against a simple relationship between ownership and performance when ownership is made multi-dimensional and considered endogeneous.
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Examples of later studies looking at large shareholders in general (not only managerial ownership) are Claessens et al (2002) , and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) . Their results support positive valuation effects associated with increases in cash-flow rights, and negative ones with control rights in excess of cash-flow rights. In both of these, a special focus is given to family firms. In Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) , the negative valuation discount associated with corporate control is present for all owner types except for financial institutions, i.e. but seems to be larger for family control, potentially because of a larger difference between cash flow rights and voting rights in this group. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) also found a negative relationship between the return-on-assets (ROA) and the level of control in their sample of Swedish listed firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that the valuation effects in family firms is opposite for two categories of control mechanisms: negative for dual-class shares, and positive for pyramids and voting agreements.
Other studies of entrenchment effects in publicly traded family firms are e.g. Oswald et al (2009) , who found a negative performance effect associated with large stakes in family firms. Studying Norwegian SMEs, Randoy and Goel (2003) also found an entrenchment effect, but only in non-founder firms, while founder firms in turn seemed to benefit from a high level of blockholder ownership. The empirical evidence for family SMEs is thus somewhat ambiguos.
Our expectation is, in line with the model by Stultz (1988) , that also in family firms, there is an entrenchment effect in terms of negative performance associated with high levels of ownership by the main owner. Unfortunately, we lack data on the type of 5 family member in charge (founding or descendant). We do have data on firm age, however. The older the firm, the less likely it is that the family member in charge is a founding member. Therefore we will also use an interaction variable, combining age and the ownership stake of the largest owner.
The effects of family ownership and management
A second question, related to the entrenchment effect, is whether family ownership is a value increasing form of ownership, i.e. given a certain level of control, whether the characteristics of the owner (family or not) has an effect on firm value or performance.
Several recent studies have focused on the effect of family, see e.g. Anderson and Reeb (2003) for the U.S., Maury (2006) , and Barontini and Caprio (2006) for Western Europe / Continental Europe, and Andres (2007) for German listed firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) found a significant positive effect for family CEOs, but mainly an insignificant effect (with a positive coefficient) for CEO descendants, while Barontini and Caprio (2006) found significant positive effects for both founder-controlled corporations, and firms with descendants on board, while the performance in firms with a descendant as a CEO was not statistically different from non-family firms. 8 Villalonga and Amit (2006) found the same positive effect for the founder, both as a CEO and a board member, with a negative effect for descendant-CEOs. Andres (2007) found that family firms are significantly more profitable than widely-held firms, but only when the founding family is active either in the executive or supervisory board. The effect was strongest when the founder serves as CEO.
Other supporting evidence for the positive effects for founders is produced by Fahlenbrach 6 (2006) and Palia (2002) . Contradicting evidence for family SMEs is offered e.g. by Barth et al (2005) , who found that family-owned firms are less productive than non-family firms. Adams et al (2008) study the question whether founder-CEO affects performance, or whether performance has an effect on founder-CEO. They found support for the surprising result that good performance makes it more likely that the founder is not in control of the firm. This creates and endogeneity bias, but such that once controlled for, the effect of founder-CEO on performance is further strengthened.
Adams et al (2008) We study the effects of family CEOs, family chairmen, as well as family members in the boards of family firms. Based on prior evidence, we expect a positive effect for family CEOs. However, Burkart et al (2003) argues that there may be a substantial "amenity potential" in line with Demsetz and Lehn (1985) in family firms, i.e. nonpecuniary private benefits of control, leading to a wish to retain control. However, if average family members are not equally qualified as externally hired, this may lead to reduced performance. We will study a specific new variable, relevant in family firms, which is the number of family members employed in the firm, as a fraction of all employees. Based on the quality related arguments by Burkhart et al (2003) , in his paper used for management, we expect that a 7 larger family involvement in general may lead to reduced performance. There may also be an endogeneity problem: family members may be more inclined to try to save a poorly performed firm, i.e. the fraction of family employees may be related to poor past performance. We will also try to control for this endogeneity bias, as well as study the relationship between family control, family CEO, and family employment, i.e. we will study the determinants for family employment in family firms.
Other control mechanisms in family firms
Corporate governance mechanisms may be used to restrict potential entrenchment effects linked with high ownership levels. External stakeholders as well as external board members are examples of such governance mechanisms. Also the size of the board may be of importance.
Non-family stakeholders in family firms have been included as control variables in some of the studies of family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) included a variable for outside unaffiliated bockholders, and found somewhat varying signs for it (a significant negative one for ROA, EBITDA, and Tobin's q in the basic models, but an insignificant one in their instrumental variable regressions. Maury (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) also included outside blockholders, and Maury obtained insignificant results for it while it was significantly negative in some of the specifications in Villalonga and Amit (2006) . Andres (2007) finds that the only blockholder type that significantly affects performance in a sample of listed firms is family blockholders. We will nevertheless study the effect of one blockholder category which is especially relevant for SMEs, i.e. venture capital. In a recent 8 study, Berger and Shaeck (2009) found, for SMEs in Italy, the U.K., and Germany, positive effects on growth and R&D spending from the use of venture capital. We will thus include a dummy for the presence of a venture capitalist.
The relationship between the fraction of outside directors (board members), and firm performance has been in the focus of many board studies. While Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Klein (1998) found the effect of outside directors to be insignificant, and also Yermack (1996) obtained ambiguous results for it, e.g. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Nguyen and Nielsen (2009) provide some evidence in favour of independent directors. 9 Especially in firms with significant stakeholders such as typically in family firms, the true independence of outside director can be questioned, since a family CEO is likely to be involved in the selection of the board members (for a discussion of the effects of that, see e.g. Shivdasani and Yermack 1999) . Despite this, the fraction of independent / outside board members has been used as a control variable also in several studies of family firms. It has mostly been insignificant, see e.g. Anderson and Reeb (2003) , Barontini and Caprio (2006) , and Villalonga and Amit (2006) . We will nevertheless also include a variable measuring the effect of family vs. non-family board members.
Finally, board size as such has been suggested as an important factor related to corporate control, and has been studied in many papers, starting from Yermack (1996) . Typically, a significant negative relationship between the size of the board and firm value as well as performance has been found (see Yermack 1996 for large U.S. industrials, and Eisenberg et al (1998) for Finnish SMEs). Theoretically, the question is less clear, e.g. Harris and Raviv 9 (2008) point that shareholders can sometimes benefit more from inside boards, and Linck et al (2007) find that very different factors drive the development of boards in small and large firms. The size of the board has e.g. been falling in large firms, but not in small ones. We will study the effect of board size in small family firms, together with variables measuring the managerial activity of the firm.
Data and variables
The study is based on data for family SMEs in Finland. 10 Part of the data was obtained using a structured web based questionnaire. The survey was conducted in February 2009, when we sent an introductory cover letter and a link to a webropol-questionnaire to randomly selected 10 148 Finnish SMEs via e-mail. This initial mailing round yielded 524 responses. Two weeks, after the initial mailing round, we sent a remainder letter and the link to the questionnaire to those companies which had not responded to the survey.
After the remainder round we got all together 982 responses yielding a response rate of 9.7 per cent. The survey identified family firms through specific questions, and asked more detailed questions on board composition, family participation etc., and only from the family firms. Out of the 982 (453) responding firms (family firms), 852 (418) could be categorized as either family or non-family firms as well as matched with key financial 10 data (turnover,ROA, ROI, and solidity) for the last full available accounting year prior to the survey. 11 These sets constitute our basic samples of all firms and the subset of family firms. Since not all survey questions were answered by all respondents, we are going to have somewhat lower number of observations (typically in certain estimations.
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Our key variables are described in Table 1 . Descritive financial statistics for the non-family as well as the family firms are reported in Table 2 , and also for two groups of family firms (with and without a family CEO). The results in Table 2 show that, as could be expected, the family firms in our sample are smaller in terms of turnover, total assets, and the number of employees as compared to the non-fimily firms, and for the last measure, the difference is statistically significant. More surprisingly, they are also less profitable than non-family firms both in terms of ROA and ROI, and significantly so for ROI. Among the family firms, the ones with a non-family CEO are on average larger in terms of all size measures, and significantly so for the number of employees. The firms with a family CEO in turn have higher profitability measures, but the differences are not statistically significant.
11 Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for our board and ownership variables. The statistics show that ownership in these firms is highly concentrated: in 79% of them, the largest single (family) owner owns more than 50% of the equity, and in 96.9%, the largest owner owns at least 20%. The chairman comes from the family in 89.5% of the cases, and the CEO in somewhat fewer, 86.1%. The average board is small, including only 2.49 members, and there are never more than 6 members in the family boards in our sample. The family proportion of the board is on average 80.8%, and on average 37.7% of the employees are family members (the average number of all employees as reported in Table   2 was 34.8 in our family firms).
These results show that we have very little variation in the degree of control as well as in the CEO / Chairman variables. The boards are also already small, which would lead us to expect that board size would not matter for profitability in this data set.
Results
The determinants of performance
To study the relationship between firm performance and family control, active family management, and corporate governance variables, we estimate a model which in its complete form is as follows: from each of the categories of Ownership, Active_Management, and Board groups of variables. We find that, in line with previous evidence, the coefficient for Family_CEO is positive and significant at the 5% level. More surprisingly, Board_Size is highly significant (with its typical negative sign) even for these in general very small boards in family firms.
Our third control variable, ownership by the largest blockholder, is positive but not significant. That means that contradictory to many prior studies of (mainly large) family 13 We test these two as alternatives, since they are both highly common in our data set. Among 417 observations for both the CEO, and the chairman (there is 1 firm for which the CEO data is not available but data on the chairman is), there are only 16 cases when the firm neither has a family CEO or chairman; 330 cases when both come from the family; 42 cases with a family chairman but a non-family CEO; and 29 cases with a family CEO but a non-family chairman.
13 firms such as we Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) , do not find any evidence supporting an entrenchment effect in our data. Of the financial variables, size is not significant, but solidity is highly significant with a positive coefficient.
Next, we replace the dummy for a family CEO with a dummy for a family chairman. That ob tai n s a posi ti v e si gn as ex pected (see col umn B i n Tabl e 4), b ut turn s ou t to b e insignificant. This is in line with earlier studies, which mostly identify the positive effect with the family CEO (or founder-CEO if such data is available).
In column C of Table 4 , results from an enlarged model (in the CEO specification), now also including variables for the proportion of family members in the board, the proportion of family employees working in the firm, and a dummy for a venture capital blockholder.
External blockholders in family firms have typically obtained insignificant or negative signs. In terms of the sign, we find the opposite: our family board participation variable (which is the opposite of more external board members) obtains a negative but insignificant sign. In line with our expectations for family employees and venture capital, the signs are negative and positive, respectively, but the variables are insignificant. When these models are estimated using ROI instead of ROA (Table 5 , columns A to C), the results are largely similar, but now also Family_Employees is significant with its negative sign. We will therefore keep family employment included in the latter models for ROA and ROI.
Next, we study the effects of the family CEO more in detail. Since we lack data on whether the CEO is a founder or not, we use as a proxy a dummy variable which takes the value of 14 1 if the firm has a family CEO and at the same time, is older than 10 years. 14 When that variable, CEO_Age_over_10, is included, it is highly significant and negative, indicating that a family CEO contributes more to the performance in younger firms (see columns D in Tables 4 and 5 ). The coefficient for Family_CEO is correspondingly increased, the difference between these two coefficients is close to the coefficient for Family_CEO alone in the prior models. Now also Family_Employees becomes significant also in the ROA specification.
Finally, we want to test for endogeneity effects. We lack data for a longer time period prior to our study, but do have data for performance one year before the data for our current financials. Column E in Tables 4 (5 
Robustness tests
We perform several robustness tests. First, in order to further test for the impact of controlling blockholders, we replace our Own_50 variable with Own_20, a dummy for the largest ownership stake being in excess of 20%. This variable is tricky since most family 15 firms have such an owner. The coefficient for that is positive but insignificant. When both variables are included, allowing for a test of a nonlinear relationship, both are positive but insignificant (with coefficients of 2.9992 and 1.7992 in a model such as the one in Table 4 , column A), indicating an increases positive effect from ownership stakes beyond 50%), i.e. no entranchment effect. Since Randoy and Goel (2003) found an entrenchment effect only in non-fouder firms, we next restrict the analysis to groups of observations where it may be more likely that non-founder firms are present. We estimate the model in Table 4 , column 1, for firms where either the the CEO is not from the family (55 observations, now
excluding Family_CEO from the model), or for the firms which are more than 10 years old (377 observations). We still find positive but insignificant coefficients for our blockholder control variables, and actually significantly so (a t-value of 1.85) for Own_20 when included as the only ownership variable in the latter case. Our results therefore do not support an entrenchment effect, and instead give weak support for the performance improving effect of a large family owner in older firms. The causality of this can naturally be questioned: is it more likely that a large owner stays in well-performing firms, or does the effect of a large owner improve firm value.
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To further test for endogeneity effects, we estimate a seemingly unrelated regression (a 2SLS equation system) where Family_CEO was conditioned on past performance and solidity, and performance on the same variables as in column D, Tables 4 and 5 .
Family_CEO as well as board size are now even more strongly positively related to performance (with t-values about or exceeding 3), while Family_CEO has a significant positive, not negative as in Adams et al (2008) , relationship with lagged performance.
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In order to test for the determinants of family employment in the firm, we finally estimated a 3SLS model where performance was related to the same variables as in column D of Tables 4 and 5 , Family_CEO to past profitability and solidity (to test for determinant of the persistence of the CEO), and Family_Employment to whether the CEO comes from the family, to past performance, and the size of the firm (to test for whether small firms dominate among the ones with many family employees). These results are reported in Table 6 . Table 6 , columns A and B, shows that our results concerning the impact of a family CEO and board size on firm performance are robust to making both the family CEO and Family_Employment endogeneous on past performance, and for Family_Employment, also on firm size 16 and a family CEO. Interestingly, there is a strong significant relationship between the degree on family employees in the firm, and a family CEO. Since family employees in turn seem to influence especially ROI negatively, this gives an interesting additional twist on the effects of a family CEO on firm performance: the effect seems positive as such, but it is decreasing with the increasing proportion of family employees which it may bring forth (and it is also decreasing with firm age).
I n T a b l e 6 , w e ha v e u s e d t he l o g a ri t hm o f t u r no v e r a s a p ro x y f o r s i z e . T he re s u l t s f o r t he Family_Employment equation (III) are practically unaffected (insignificant for size) if turnover is replaced by the number of employees.
Summary and conclusions
The effects of family on firm performance have mostly been studied using listed firms, where a negative entrenchment effect from a large ownership, but a positive one from a family CEO / a founder CEO has been reported. We study small unlisted family firms using a rich set of variables, controlling for ownership, family management, board composition and size, one type of external blockholders (venture capitalists) as well as family employees.
We do not find that the Finnish family firms in our sample would be more profitable than the control group, nor do we find an entrenchment effect, since our coefficients for increased ownership levels by the main owner are persistently positive. In line with previous literature, we find a positive effect on ROA and ROI from a family CEO.
Specification tests indicate that this is reduced over time (when it becomes less likely that the CEO is the founder itself). Tests for endogeneity indicate that it at least is not the very recent past performance, which through CEO persistence, would cause the CEO effect. Surprisingly, we find that board size is negatively related to performance also in this group of family firms, where boards in general are small. Other corporate governance variables such as more external board members (i.e. less family members) as well as an external blockholder (a venture capital investor) are not significantly related to p e r f o r m a n c e . H o w e v e r , f a m i l y p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h r o u g h a l a r g e r n u m b e r o f f a m i l y employees is negatively related to especially ROI. 3SLS regressions indicate that such family employment is endogeneous to the presence of a family CEO, leading to a lower 18 positive the net impact from a family CEO. Our results are robust to a number of specification tests.
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